ONCE AGAIN: THE CASE FOR PARSONS'S VOLUNTARISM*
Mr. Heeren has reiterated criticisms which have become the stock-in-trade of Parsons interpretation. Far from being unaware of the points he raises, I directed much of my reinterpretive efforts precisely to such objections. After years of partial misinterpretation and often misleading debate, the process of incorporating the important breakthroughs that Parsons achieved will, evidently, be a difficult and uneven one. Old myths die slowly.
Let me make four points:
(1) Voluntarism is not antithetical to systems analysis, nor, certainly, is it antithetical to normative control. One of the primary reasons for distinguishing, as I did in my article, *Address all communications to: Jeffrey C. Alexander; Department of Sociology; University of California; Los Angeles, CA 90024. between the formal and substantive elements in Parsons's work is to point to the multilevel character of any social theory. There is a wide range of diverse components in any theory; these components may be viewed as forming a continuum from the most general kinds of commitments to the most specific (Alexander, 1980, Vol. 1, Pt. 1). Every theory contains general presuppositional commitments (what I called theoretic-epistemic, or formal elements), as well as very specific propositional statements which are much more directly derived from empricial observation. In between these two poles of the continuum, there are a number of other kinds of commitments. Ideological assumptions, for example, derive neither from presuppositions nor from empirical observation; combined with empirical propositions, however, they form the substantive elements of a sociological theory.
Another kind of intermediate element, and here we come to the issue of systems, is the kind of model a theorist chooses. The fundamental point here is that commitments to models and commitments to presuppositions vary independently. A multidimensional, voluntaristic approach on the theoretic-epistemic level can be combined with systemic models, and the result will be a voluntaristic model of social systems. On the other hand, an instrumentalist, deterministic approach at the presuppositional level, which disallows the resort to transcendent values upon which voluntarism must be based, also may be combined with a systemic model. In this case, the system theory in question will, indeed, be antivoluntaristic and deterministic. Far from his system model pushing him into an overly rigid determinism, there is, in fact, the danger that Parsons's model will slip into an overly voluntaristic position. Insofar as his presuppositional synthesis of idealism and materialism falters, this slippage frequently occurs.
To respond to a related point, voluntarism does not depend on whether an "actor's choice" is preserved, nor does it depend on whether or not an actor is described as a "member" of a normative system. In the first place, every concrete actor has a choice in every concrete situation. Parsons has never denied free will in this limited sense; he has spoken, rather, of the probability that norms will be followed in a given instance (Parsons and Shils, 1951:155-6). These norms, of course, might be, in substantive terms, highly individualistic and critical ones, so that the conformity to norms cannot be confused with conformity in the pejorative, common sense use of the term. This observation leads to my second point: it is a nominalist error, associ-ated with classical liberalism and neo-Kantian theory, to identify voluntarism with free will in the strong sense, that is, with the actions of a completely nonconstrained and nonsocialized actor. There is a long tradition in social thought, most recently exhibited by Durkheim, Freud, and Piaget, which believes, correctly in my opinion, that freedom depends, in part, on certain distinctive internal qualities which are produced only through association and internalization.
( , 1971: 40-3, 49-54, 71-4) . This does not sound like inevitable differentiation to me.
I would agree, however, that Parsons is often overly optimistic about the emergence of differentiated structures. One of the primary justifications for this optimism is his insistence that differentiation is produced by a system's need for "functional adaptation" to structured, long-term disequilibrium. Less optimistic than Parsons, I wonder whether a bureaucratic state, less differentiated from the legal and religious systems, might not be more adaptive, in many respects, than a democratic, more differentiated system. It was this question which prompted me to make one of the distinctions I emphasize in my article, namely, that an ideological commitment to individual emancipation has affected, and perhaps made less realistic, Parsons's understanding of the actual course which societal differentiation takes. 
